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"The maritime domain - including international waters, the sea
approaches to the United States, our territorial seas, and other U.S. navi-
gable waters - are guarded by a dynamic and highly effective partnership
between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard. The U.S. Navy defends
the sea approaches to the United States and works with the U.S. Coast
Guard to patrol international waters and our territorial seas."
- Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense'
I. INTRODUCTION
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale noted that the Coast
Guard and Navy share the responsibility of defending the American
homeland from attack. Yet it is important to allocate responsibilities
with respect to different threats in order to avoid the needless duplica-
tion of efforts or capabilities, or even worse, a situation where the appro-
priate response capability is lacking due to ambiguity in responsibility.
The nature of this delineation of responsibilities, however, is a matter
that is still being determined, especially with regard to the potential
threat of maritime terrorism targeting the United States' shores. This
Note proposes that the Coast Guard's unique role as both an armed force
and a law enforcement agency makes it ideally suited to combat most
threats of maritime terrorism bound for the United States' territory,
regardless of whether the aggression falls under the purview of "home-
land security" or "homeland defense."2 The Navy, on the other hand,
should provide support to the Coast Guard when necessary to secure and
defend the homeland from terrorism.
Our government has identified the significant threats maritime ter-
rorism poses for our collective security and continues to develop strate-
gies to counter these threats.' Yet the emergence of terrorism as the
paramount threat to the United States' security has created unprece-
dented national security dilemmas and debates. In countering terrorism,
novel concerns have arisen, such as a debate over the military's involve-
ment in domestic security, the difference between homeland security and
homeland defense, and whether counterterrorism is appropriately con-
sidered a military or law enforcement mission.4 While policymakers
1. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities,
109th Cong. 5 (2005) (statement of the Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense), available at http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/109thcongress/
Terrorism,%20Unconventional%2OThreats/3-15-05McHale.pdf.
2. See infra text accompanying note 148 for a distinction between homeland security and
homeland defense.
3. See infra Part HI.
4. Under U.S. law, acts of terrorism involve the commission of a crime, in most cases
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and scholars continue to struggle with these questions, this Note will
instead address a much narrower question incidental to these broader
concerns: specifically, the legal issues and policy concerns behind
apportioning interdiction responsibilities between the Departments of
Defense and Homeland Security with respect to maritime counterterror-
ism operations. For a variety of reasons explained below, this Note will
stress the importance of interagency cooperation in countering maritime
terrorism, but will also explain why the Coast Guard is the appropriate
agency to respond to most incidents of maritime terrorist threats that
directly target the American homeland.
II. THE THREATS
With the end of the Cold War, there arose a false optimism that the
United States would no longer face the prospect of an armed attack upon
its shores. It took the tragic events of September 11, 2001, to shake
America from its complacency and force the country to squarely con-
front the reality that terrorism, and terrorists' potential use of weapons of
mass destruction ("WMD") 5 against the United States, is now the pre-
eminent threat to national security. Maritime terrorism is but one mani-
festation of the terrorist threat, yet the potential implications of a
successful maritime smuggling venture involving WMD attacks at sea,
or strikes against a major port, are grave. The possibility of a maritime
terrorist attack against United States territory is very real and is demon-
rendering domestic counterterrorism a law enforcement responsibility. Although there are various
definitions of "terrorism," this Note applies the definitions for international and domestic
terrorism under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 (West 2004):
(1) the term "international terrorism" means activities that - (A) involve violent acts
or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended
- (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur
primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the
persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their
perpetrators operate or seek asylum; ... (5) the term "domestic terrorism" means
activities that - (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended - (i) to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur
primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 (West 2004).
5. As defined in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332a(c) (West 2004), WMD include destructive devices as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2000) (explosives and large bore weapons), and chemical, biological
and radiological weapons.
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strated by the existence of an "al-Qaeda navy" consisting of approxi-
mately fifteen ships,6 the discovery of an al-Qaeda training manual on
maritime attacks,7 and the occurrence of previous instances of maritime
terrorism.
A. Examples of Previous Instances of Maritime Terrorism
There have already been several major incidents of maritime terror-
ism in the last two decades, all having taken place abroad. Perhaps the
most infamous act of maritime terrorism was the October 1985 hijacking
of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro.8 This incident sparked an inter-
national uproar, and in large part compelled the United Nations General
Assembly to pass a resolution9 condemning terrorism and urging States
to contribute to its elimination. The Achille Lauro incident also exposed
a gap in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS").' ° When UNCLOS was adopted in 1982, the Achille
Lauro incident had not yet occurred, and the bipolar world order of the
Cold War dominated the thoughts of national security experts and
policymakers. Accordingly, while UNCLOS does establish universal
jurisdiction over acts of piracy in accordance with customary interna-
tional law, 1 it does not address maritime terrorism per se. Further,
UNCLOS defines piracy as an act of violence, detention, or depredation
committed by the crew of a ship or aircraft, directed at another ship or
aircraft. 12 This traditional definition, which requires violence from one
ship against another, does not extend universal jurisdiction to many
forms of maritime terrorist activities, such as passenger hijackings or
vessel bombings.
To remedy this jurisdictional gap, States negotiated the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation ("SUA Convention"). 3 While it, too, does not confer uni-
6. John Mintz, 15 Freighters Believed to Be Linked to Al Qaeda; U.S. Fears Terrorists at
Sea; Tracking Ships Is Difficult, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2002, at Al.
7. See Gregory Katz, Risk of Shipping Attacks Growing; Containers on Rail, Rigs, Ships
Move Globally, in U.S. with Little Scrutiny, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 2, 2002, at IA.
8. See Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the
IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 Am. J. INT'L. L. 269 (1988) (discussing the hijacking and
whether maritime terrorism can be considered "piracy").
9. G.A. Res. 40/61, U 1, 5-8, 13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/61 (Dec. 9, 1985), available at http://
www.un.org/tefforism/res.htm.
10. United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
11. Id. arts. 100-107, 110.
12. Id. art. 101.
13. International Maritime Organization Convention and Protocol from the International
Conference on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar.
10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668.
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versal jurisdiction beyond acts of piracy, it requires States to criminalize
certain violent acts at sea 4 and to cooperate in enforcement' 5 as well as
apprehension 16 and extradition' 7 of maritime terrorists. Although the
SUA Convention currently has 126 State parties, representing 82.12% of
the world's merchant fleet by tonnage,' 8 the threat of maritime terrorism
has not diminished.
In October 2000, an al-Qaeda sponsored suicide boat attacked the
destroyer USS Cole in Yemen claiming the lives of seventeen sailors
and nearly sinking the ship.' 9 This attack was followed two years later
by another successful suicide boat attack in Yemen against the French
tanker Limburg, which resulted in one death and a large oil slick, not to
mention significant economic disruption to the Yemeni economy.2 ° In
April 2004, another suicide boat attack against Iraq's Al-Basra and
Khawr al-Amaya oil terminals was thwarted, but claimed the lives of
two Navy sailors and one Coast Guardsman. 2' The most costly incident
of recent maritime terrorism was the February 2004 bombing of the
Superferry 14 in the Philippines by the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf.22
This attack resulted in the destruction of the ship and over one-hundred
deaths.23 It takes little effort to imagine the consequences if such an
attack were directed at a large cruise ship carrying thousands of
passengers.
B. Other Potential Forms of Maritime Terrorism
These major incidents of maritime terrorism were limited to attacks
against ships and oil terminals. However, maritime terrorism has the
potential to manifest itself in forms that pose an even greater threat to
lives and property. While hijackings and attacks against vessels can be
extremely costly, an attack against a port could have even graver conse-
quences. The accidental explosions that utterly destroyed the ports of
14. Id. arts. 3-6.
15. Id. arts. 12-14.
16. Id. arts. 7-8.
17. Id. art. 11.
18. Press Release, International Maritime Organization, Revised Treaties to Address
Unlawful Acts at Sea Adopted at International Conference (Oct. 17, 2005), available at http:/I
www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp? topicid= 1018&docid=5334.
19. WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE, THE OUTLAW SEA 38 (North Point Press 2004).
20. Id. at 38-39.
21. Kendra Helmer, Suicide Bombing Attack Claims First Coast Guardsman Since Vietnam
War, STARS AND STRIPES - EUROPEAN EDITION, Apr. 27, 2004, available at http://www.estripes
.conarticle.asp?section= 104&article=21023&archive=true.
22. Captain James Pelkofski, Before the Storm: Al Qaeda's Coming Maritime Campaign,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE U.S. NAVAL INST., Dec. 2005, at 21-22.
23. Id. at 22.
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Texas City in 194724 and Halifax in 1917,2 causing thousands of deaths,
demonstrate that an attack against a major port has the potential to create
severe loss of life and property, as well as to sever a critical commercial
artery. A disabling attack upon a port may be carried out in many ways.
Several examples include the use of a high-yield ammonium nitrate-fuel
oil bomb or a "dirty nuke' '2 6 smuggled in a shipping container,2 7 the use
of a ship itself as a WMD (for example, placing a bomb on a tanker
carrying highly volatile liquid natural gas), 8 or the scuttling of a
hijacked ship in a harbor's channel to obstruct shipping. Because mari-
time trade comprises 90% of the United States' overseas trade and is the
lifeblood of its economy,a 9 ports make attractive targets for terrorists
who seek to inflict economic damage in addition to loss of life and
property.3°
Maritime terrorism can manifest itself in other forms as well. The
most basic threat of maritime-related terrorism is the shipboard smug-
gling of WMD, their components, and even terrorists themselves. 3'
Indeed, the oceans' sheer vastness and the ease of maritime transport
make shipborne smuggling the likely means terrorists would choose to
bring WMD into the United States.32 The issues related to terrorism and
smuggling create a need for a global interdiction capability to address
these threats even before they reach our shores. In addition, some poten-
24. See 1947 Texas City Disaster, http://www.local1259iaff.org/disaster.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2006).
25. See HRM - Community - Halifax Explosion, http://www.halifax.ca/community/explode
.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
26. The term "dirty nuke," as opposed to a true nuclear explosive, describes an explosive
device that detonates through a conventional, chemical reaction in order to disperse radioactive
material. While not as destructive as a nuclear bomb, a "dirty nuke" requires less expertise to
create, but still requires the bomb maker to obtain radioactive material.
27. See STEPHEN FLYNN, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE 17-35 (Harper Collins 2004)
(illustrating a hypothetical attack against a U.S. port, including the use of a bomb smuggled in a
shipping container).
28. See Tanker Blast Could Have Wide Reach; Report Says a Terrorist Attack on a Shipment
of Liquid Natural Gas Could Spread Fire a Mile Away, L.A. TiMEs, Dec. 21, 2004, at A31.
29. ROUND TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AsSOCIATIONS, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING -
CARRIER OF WORLD TRADE 2 (Maritime Int'l Secretariat Services Ltd. 2005), available at http://
www.marisec.org/worldtradeflyer.pdf.
30. See Commander Stephen E. Flynn, U.S.C.G., Homeland Security Is a Coast Guard
Mission, in TODAY'S BEST MILITARY WRITING 269, 274 (Walter J. Boyne, ed., Forge Books 2004)
(explaining the potentially devastating economic consequences of a successful terrorist attack that
disables a major port).
31. See LANGEWIESCHE, supra note 19, at 40-43 (discussing, inter alia, the strange case of
Amid Farid Rizk, who was nicknamed "container Bob" after he was apprehended in October 2001
in Italy while attempting to smuggle himself into Canada in a neatly furnished shipping container).
32. See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY 4 (Sept.
2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/HSPD13_MaritimeSecurityStrategy
.pdf; Flynn, supra note 30, at 270-72.
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tial threats may wreak havoc domestically from beyond American
shores. Some security experts have opined that a cargo ship of "al-
Qaeda's navy" armed with a SCUD missile is yet another possible threat
against which the United States must guard.33
In light of the aforementioned examples of possible maritime ter-
rorist threats, which amount to a mere handful of the myriad ways ter-
rorists may use the sea to attack American shores, there can be little
doubt that the United States' 95,000 miles of shoreline and 301 ports of
entry34 will be highly vulnerable to terrorism unless significant steps to
enhance security are taken.
1II. COUNTERING THE THREATS
The United States has taken numerous, meaningful steps towards
protecting the homeland from terrorist attacks. One significant step was
the consolidation of all the federal agencies responsible for border pro-
tection under the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), pursuant
to the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 35 The signing of the bill on
January 25, 2003, joined twenty-two agencies consisting of 210,000 per-
sonnel under the DHS, including the Coast Guard. 36 This major reor-
ganization of government agencies was intended to optimize
interoperability and information sharing and reduce needless redundancy
in capabilities and operations. While there have been significant
improvements, it will take a few years of initial growing pains before the
United States will reap the reorganization's optimum benefits.
A. The Establishment of Northern Command and its Role in
Homeland Defense
In April 2002, the President announced the addition of United
States Northern Command ("NORTHCOM") to the unified command
plan, thereby establishing a Department of Defense ("DoD") entity
responsible for homeland defense. 37 NORTHCOM's mission is
[to c]onduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and
aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests
within the assigned area of responsibility (AOR); and
[a]s directed by the [P]resident or [S]ecretary of [D]efense, provide
33. Otto Kreisher, A New Missile Threat?, SEA POWER, Nov. 2005, at 26-27.
34. Flynn, supra note 27, at 12.
35. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
36. Constantine G. Papavizas & Lawrence I. Kiern, 2001-2002 U.S. Maritime Legislative
Developments, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 451, 459 (2003).
37. See U.S. Northern Command: History, http://www.northcom.mil/about us/history.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
20071
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
defense support of civil authorities including consequence manage-
ment operations.
[U.S. Northern Command] plans, organizes, and executes homeland
defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned
forces. The command is assigned forces whenever necessary to exe-
cute missions as ordered by the [P]resident .... 38
Despite ongoing clarification efforts, the delineation of responsibility
between the DHS's role in homeland security and the DoD and
NORTHCOM's roles in homeland defense remains somewhat murky.
Although the Office of Homeland Security made a distinction between
homeland security and homeland defense on the theory that the latter
involves military attacks against the homeland, 39 there still exists ambi-
guity stemming from the matter of whether a response to a non-State
terrorist threat is properly considered a "military" or a "law enforce-
ment" mission.40 Below, this Note will explore the differences between
these missions in the maritime realm, concluding with recommendations
concerning the delineation of responsibilities with respect to the
interdiction of maritime terrorist threats.4
B. Other Maritime Security Initiatives and Policies
In addition to the restructuring of our government and its command
and control frameworks, there have been other significant initiatives and
strategic plans to battle maritime terrorism. On May 31, 2003, President
Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI"), which
seeks global cooperation in the interdiction of WMD, their delivery sys-
tems, and related materials.4 2 The objectives of the PSI and the suppres-
sion of maritime terrorism are supported by the October 2005 draft
protocol to amend the SUA Convention,43 which opened for signature in
38. U.S. Northern Command - About Us, http://www.northcom.mil/about-us/aboutus.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
39. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (July 16, 2002),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/nat-strat-hls.pdf.
40. See, e.g., Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307, 308-316 (2003) (explaining that since September 11, 2001, there
has been a fundamental shift from viewing terrorism as a criminal act towards an increasing view
that terrorism is an act of war).
41. See infra Part VIII.
42. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet on Proliferation Security Initiative and
Statement of Interdiction Principles (Sept. 4, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/09/20030904-11 .html; Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The
Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 Am. J. INT'L L. 526, 528 (2004).
43. International Conference on the Revision of the SUA Treaties, Consideration of a Draft
Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (Oct. 13, 2005) (on file with author).
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February 2006. According to the International Maritime Organization,
the amendments to the SUA Convention will
broaden the list of offences made unlawful under the treaties, such as
to include the offence of using a ship itself in a manner that causes
death or serious injury or damage and the transport of weapons or
equipment that could be used for weapons of mass destruction. The
2005 SUA Protocol introduces provisions for the boarding of ships
where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship or a per-
son on board the ship is, has been, or is about the be involved in, the
commission of an offence under the Convention."
The ship boarding provisions of the amendments to the SUA Conven-
tion, along with bilateral ship boarding agreements between the United
States and foreign flag States, will expand the maritime interdiction
capabilities of the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy around the globe, at least
with respect to the boarding of vessels flagged by participating States.
The question of obtaining jurisdiction to board, search, and detain
vessels suspected of terrorist activities that are not flying the flag of a
State participating in cooperative arrangements such as the PSI or SUA
is a complex and broad issue and is beyond the scope of this Note,
although it has been analyzed elsewhere.45 It is United States policy to
comport with international law,4 6 as indicated in the PSI's interdiction
principles.47 In most circumstances, the interdiction of any given con-
firmed threat will be justifiable under international law by treaty or ad
hoc flag State consent, customary international law,48 the self-defense
44. Press Release, International Maritime Organization, Revised Treaties to Address
Unlawful Acts at Sea Adopted at International Conference (Oct. 17, 2005), available at http://
www.imo.org/Newsroommainframe.asp?topic-id= 1018&docid=5334.
45. See, e.g., Byers, supra note 42; Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the
Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 131
(2005); Samuel E. Logan, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the Legal Challenges,
14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 253 (2005); Justin S.C. Mellor, Missing the Boat: The Legal and
Practical Problems of the Prevention of Maritime Terrorism, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 341
(2002); see also Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon for All
Nations Against International Crime, 9 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 1 (2000) (advocating the
establishment of universal jurisdiction over the crimes of drug smuggling and terrorism).
46. E.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (declaring that "[i]ntemational law is
part of our law").
47. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement
of Interdiction Principles (Sept. 4, 2003) (citing the PSI's objective to "stop shipments of WMD,
delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and
frameworks") (emphasis supplied)), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/
09/20030904-1 .html.
48. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 402-403 (1987) (describing the various theories allowing a State to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction).
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provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,49 or other
sources." For the purpose of discussing the DoD and DHS's roles in
the interdiction of maritime threats bound for the United States, this
Note will presume the existence of a legitimate jurisdictional basis for
such operations.
Other examples of efforts taken to enhance global maritime secur-
ity include the International Maritime Organization's International Ship
and Port Facility Security Code51 ("ISPS") and its domestic codification
through the Maritime Transportation and Security Act of 2002,52 U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's Container Security Initiative
("CSI"),53 and the military antiterrorism efforts abroad in Operation
Enduring Freedom and domestically in Operation Noble Eagle. The
White House has also promulgated doctrines on protecting the homeland
from terrorism including, inter alia, the National Security Strategy of
the United States54 and the National Strategy for Homeland Security,55
both of which were issued in 2002. To prevent terrorist attacks within
the United States, these strategies recognize the importance of interdict-
ing threats as far away from our borders as. possible.
Pursuant to these strategies, the Coast Guard released its own doc-
trine on protecting the homeland from maritime threats in its Maritime
Strategy for Homeland Security56 in December 2002. The Coast
49. U.N. Charter art. 51 (affirming the "inherent right" to use force in self-defense against an
"armed attack"). There is debate whether this authorizes preemptive use of force against non-
State actors such as terrorists absent authorization by the United Nations Security Council; see
Byers, supra note 42, at 532 (describing valid preemptive applications of art. 51); but see Logan,
supra note 45, at 270 (dismissing "pre-emptive military action.., as a legitimate exercise of self-
defense").
50. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1540, 11 2-3, 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls upon States to take actions to prevent
terrorist proliferation of WMD).
51. The ISPS imposes new international regulations upon the shipping industry, including,
inter alia, requirements for security plans for "ships and port facilities" and long-range tracking of
ships at sea. See IMO Adopts Comprehensive Maritime Security Measures, http://www.imo.org/
Newsroomlmainframe.asp?topic-id=583&docid=2689#code (last visited Dec. 19, 2005).
52. Maritime Transportation and Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064
(unofficially codified at 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 70101-70117 (West 2004)).
53. Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Fact Sheet: Container Security
Initiative (Sept. 30, 2006) (describing the CSI's objectives to effectively extend the United States'
borders by inspecting shipping containers abroad, before they arrive at American ports), available
at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border security/internationalactivities/csi (click "Downloadable
CSI Fact Sheet").
54. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf.
55. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (July 16, 2002),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/nat-strat hls.pdf.
56. U.S. COAST GUARD, MARITIME STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (2002), available at
http://www.uscg.mil/news/reportsandbudget/Maritime-strategy/USCG-Maritme-Strategy.pdf.
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Guard's strategy stressed the importance of interagency cooperation and
communication 57  to improve "Maritime Domain Awareness"
("MDA").58 For matters of "Maritime Homeland Security," the Coast
Guard is the lead agency supported by the DoD,59 and those roles are
reversed in matters of "Maritime Homeland Defense."6  It also
described the concept of a "layered" defense to defeat threats far from
the Unites States' shores and to provide back-up capabilities in detection
and response should a threat slip by unnoticed.61 The Strategy also rec-
ognized terrorism's dual nature as either an act of war or a crime62 and
distinguished between the two on the basis of whether any given inci-
dent could be linked to a State sponsor.6 3
C. The National Strategy for Maritime Security
In September 2005, the White House released the National Strategy
for Maritime Security.64 It states that "[d]efending against enemies is
the first and most fundamental commitment of the United States Gov-
ernment. Preeminent among our national security priorities is to take all
necessary steps to prevent WMD from entering the country and to avert
an attack on the homeland. 65  The Strategy reaffirms the goal of
interdicting terrorists before they are able to attack the homeland:
The United States will prevent potential adversaries from attacking
the maritime domain or committing unlawful acts there by monitor-
ing and patrolling its maritime borders, maritime approaches, and
exclusive economic zones, as well as high seas areas of national
interest, and by stopping such activities at any stage of development
or deployment. The United States will work to detect adversaries
before they strike ... to block their freedom of movement ... [and]
stop them from entering the United States.... If terrorists cannot be
57. Id. at 23.
58. Id. at 20. Maritime Domain Awareness is defined as "comprehensive information,
intelligence, and knowledge of all relevant entities within the U.S. Maritime Domain - and their
respective activities - that could affect America's security, safety, economy or environment." Id.
at 32.
59. Id. at 12. "Maritime Homeland Security" is described as "the concerted national effort
lead by the U.S. Coast Guard to secure the homeland associated with or in the U.S. Maritime
Domain from terrorist attacks." Id. at 32.
60. Id. at 13.
61. U.S. COAST GUARD, MARITIME STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 56, at
28-29.
62. Id. at 9. When an act of terrorism has "State sponsorship" it is considered an act of war,
and conversely when there is no sponsor the act is considered a "criminal act." Id.
63. Id. at 4. What constitutes a "state sponsor" of terrorism is not clearly defined, although
under 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d) (2006), exports are restricted to the following designated State
supporters of international terrorism: "Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria."
64. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 32.
65. Id. at 7.
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
deterred by the layered maritime security, then they must be inter-
dicted and defeated, preferably overseas.66
To achieve the aforementioned preventative goals, the Strategy calls for
a multi-faceted approach to improving maritime domain awareness,
through such activities as maritime patrols and monitoring, improvement
in interagency operability and communications, and enhanced intelli-
gence gathering, sharing, and analysis.67 The Strategy also recognizes
the need to develop tactical plans for the interdiction of possible and
confirmed threats68 and that either military or law enforcement entities
could respond to maritime terrorist events. 69 The Strategy also calls for
the development of a Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan7° to
coordinate the government's strategic-level response to maritime threats
against the homeland by designating roles and responsibilities.
D. The Navy and Coast Guard and Maritime Threats to
National Security
The abovementioned group of established plans designates
response strategies for threats and acts of terrorism. As a practical mat-
ter, when it comes to seaborne threats beyond our territorial seas -
whether they are acts of war or terrorism, including conventional acts of
violence or those involving WMD, or ordinary crimes such as piracy,
drug smuggling, illegal migration, and fisheries violations - it will be
either the Navy or Coast Guard that must respond. These are simply the
only governmental entities with the ships and armament to deal with
maritime acts of war or terrorism. 7' In traditional areas of law enforce-
66. Id. at 8-9.
67. Id. at 16-17, 22.
68. Id. at 21.
69. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 32, at 22.
70. Id. at 27; THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY: MARITIME
OPERATIONAL THREAT RESPONSE PLAN (2005) (on file with author). Although the plan addresses
this Note's topic of the apportionment of interdiction responsibilities in response to maritime
terrorist threats, the plan is considered "for official use only" and therefore cannot be discussed in
this forum.
71. According to the National Response Plan, the Attorney General, acting through the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), has lead responsibility for the criminal investigation of
terrorist incidents. NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, TERRORISM INCIDENT LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
INVESTIGATION ANNEX (Dec. 2004). Because this Note addresses the responsibilities of the DoD
and DHS with regard to maritime terrorism, the Department of Justice's role is beyond the scope
of this Note. There has been friction between the Coast Guard and FBI regarding each agency's
proper role in combating maritime terrorism. FBI, Coast Guard in Squabble, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Apr. 3, 2006, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/20O6/04/03/terror/main1467671 .shtml.
This friction may be the result of the National Response Plan's failure to address the specific
threat of maritime terrorism. Regardless, this Note will assume that the FBI's lack of appropriate
platforms for maritime interception operations requires either the Coast Guard or Navy to serve as
first responder to most incidents of maritime terrorism.
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ment, the Coast Guard has the lead role and at times acts with the sup-
port of the Navy. 72  In times of war, the Navy has either taken
operational control of Coast Guard assets or absorbed the organization
as a whole.7 3 Yet the novel problem of maritime terrorism, and its dual
nature as a crime and a military threat, poses questions concerning the
appropriate roles of the Navy and Coast Guard. To identify these roles,
it is first necessary to identify these two services' general legal
authorities.
IV. THE DOD, DHS, COAST GUARD, NAVY, AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT
From a legal perspective, the Coast Guard and Navy differ prima-
rily in their law enforcement authority. While the Coast Guard, since its
inception in 1790 as the Revenue-Cutter Service,74 continues to serve as
a law enforcement agency with distinct statutory authority, 75 the Navy
has no general statutory law enforcement authority. This distinction is
solely based on domestic law and policy, as international law recognizes
naval vessels as having law enforcement authority where the flag State
has jurisdiction. 76 The lack of any stand-alone statutory authority for the
Navy to conduct domestic law enforcement is the result, at least in part,
of the question of whether the military should be involved in law
enforcement in the first place.7 7
Indeed, the use of the armed forces to enforce domestic laws has
spurred much debate. 78 Arguments for or against military involvement
72. This routinely occurs in counter-narcotics operations, where Naval assets operate under
Coast Guard commanders' tactical control to effect the interdiction of drug smugglers. See infra
text accompanying notes 98-100.
73. See 14 U.S.C. §§ 1-4, 10 U.S.C. § 5013a (2000) (granting authority for the Coast Guard
to act as a "specialized service" within the Navy upon declaration of war or upon direction of the
President). The Coast Guard has not been transferred in its entirety to the Navy since World War
II, although certain Coast Guard assets have been assigned to operate with the Navy in all wars
post-World War II. See JOHNSON, infra note 74, at 194-95, 281, 331-32.
74. The original system of cutters, intended to combat smugglers who sought to avoid the
payment of tariffs, initially operated in a customs role as the maritime adjunct to the Treasury
Department. It was not widely known as the Revenue-Cutter Service until the 1890s. ROBERT
ERWIN JOHNSON, GUARDIANS OF THE SEA: HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, 1915
TO THE PRESENT 1-2 (United States Naval Institute 1987).
75. 14 U.S.C. §§ 2, 89, 143 (2000).
76. UNCLOS, supra note 10, arts. 107, 110, 111, 224.
77. The applicable DoD Directive acknowledges "the historic tradition of limiting direct
military involvement in civilian law enforcement activities." DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
DIRECTIVE 5525.5, DoD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, art. 4 (Dec.
20, 1989). For an argument against military involvement in civil law enforcement, see generally
Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement,
21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 383 (2003).
78. See, e.g., Commander Gary Felicetti, U.S.C.G. & Lieutenant John Luce, U.S.C.G., The
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in law enforcement range in scope and justification. These arguments
are based on statutory interpretation, or sometimes the more ambiguous
question of whether there is a traditional aversion to military law
enforcement efforts under the American ethos or the Constitution
itself.79 In addition to "libertarian" concerns, there is also the question
of whether the use of the military in any domestic capacity would detract
from its warfighting readiness8" or embroil it in politics.
A. The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Laws and Policies
Military lawyers, policymakers, and civilian scholars have long
struggled over whether the famous (or perhaps infamous)8 Posse Comi-
tatus Act ("PCA")82 applies to the Navy. Because this subject has
Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight on 124 Years of Mischief and Misunderstanding
Before Any More Damage Is Done, 175 MIL. L. REv. 86 (2003) (providing an in-depth analysis of
the Posse Comitatus Act's legislative history, criticizing the modem application of the Act and
related laws as a relic of the post-Civil War Reconstruction Era. and describing the DoD's
interpretation of the Act as overly restrictive); Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another
Nail in the Coffin for Posse Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL' 99 (2003) (describing how the
military's involvement in the war on drugs has eroded the Posse Comitatus Act's significance and
how the war on terror may result in an increase of domestic military intervention); Kealy, supra
note 76 (criticizing the use of the military in domestic law enforcement and calling for a revision
of the Posse Comitatus Act and related laws to secure civil liberties from infringement by
domestic use of the armed forces); Lieutenant John P. Coffey, U.S.N.R., The Navy's Role in
Interdicting Narcotics Traffic. War on Drugs or Ambush on the Constitution?, 75 GEo. L.J. 1947
(1987) (asserting that any .Naval involvement in law enforcement without an express grant from
Congress is illegal).
79. Opponents of the use of the armed forces in law enforcement point to the U.S.
Constitution's provisions that grant Congress authority to appropriate funds for an Army but limit
funding to just two years, thereby keeping the Army in check and requiring a periodic
reassessment of the merits of having a standing Army. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. While not
determinative of whether the founding fathers collectively opposed the use of the military to
enforce the law, the provisions do reflect our nation's principle of civilian control over the
military and the aversion to standing military forces held by some of our founders. Interestingly,
no such appropriations restrictions are imposed upon the Navy. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 12.
For a comprehensive discussion of the constitutional and historical elements of the use of the
military to enforce the law, see Felicetti & Luce, supra note 78, at 93-147.
80. See 10 U.S.C. § 376 (2000) (prohibiting military assistance to civilian law enforcement
where such assistance would "adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States" and
requiring the Secretary of Defense to pass regulations to prevent a degradation in readiness). See
also Lieutenant Commander Michael T. Cunningham, U.S.C.G.R., The Military's Involvement in
Law Enforcement: The Threat Is Not What You Think, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 699 (2003) (arguing
that concern over the military's involvement in law enforcement should not focus on the unlikely
possibility of abuse of power, but rather on the degradation in military readiness combat units
experience when conducting law enforcement missions).
81. The term "infamous" is used due to the widespread and unresolved debate the PCA has
caused. By one count, between 1990 and 2003 there were thirteen articles on the topic in THm
ARMy LAWYER, as well as numerous articles in the civilian sector. Id. at 700.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000) (The PCA states: "Whoever, except in cases and under
circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part
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already been examined in depth,83 this Note will provide an abbreviated
analysis of the PCA and Naval participation in law enforcement.
The short and obvious answer is that the PCA does not apply to the
Navy because the statute's terms refer only to the Army and Air Force
and criminalize their use as a domestic police force.8 4 Yet the PCA does
not stand alone in governing the military's involvement in law enforce-
ment. Chapter 18 of Title 10 of the United States Code has additional
provisions covering all DoD branches of the armed forces.85 The
Navy's potential role in domestic law enforcement is muddled as a result
of a statutory mandate under Title 10 that requires the Secretary of
Defense to promulgate regulations prohibiting the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marines from "direct participation ... in a search, seizure,
arrest, or similar activity."86
The military's involvement in law enforcement is further compli-
cated by a list of statutory exceptions to the general prohibition on law
enforcement activities, allowing the DoD to furnish training, facilities,
and equipment to state and federal law enforcement agencies.87 In addi-
tion, the DoD may assign personnel to operate equipment provided at
the request of any federal law enforcement agency that has jurisdiction
to enforce customs, narcotics, immigration, and antiterrorism laws.88
The authority to operate equipment is somewhat circumscribed, how-
ever, to achieve a list of numerated ends.89 These objectives include,
inter alia, aerial reconnaissance, detection and monitoring of criminal
threats, transportation of law enforcement personnel, and the intercep-
of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both").
83. Lieutenant Christopher A. Abel, U.S.C.G., Not Fit for Sea Duty: The Posse Comitatus
Act, the United States Navy, and Federal Law Enforcement at Sea, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 445
(1990) (providing a thorough analysis of the PCA and its application to the Navy and making the
argument that the Navy can and should participate in law enforcement on the high seas). Despite
the sound arguments presented by Lt. Abel and others, DoD and Navy policy continues to prohibit
the Navy from conducting direct law enforcement activities.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000); see, e.g., United States v. Acosta-Cartagena, 128 F. Supp. 2d
69, 71 (D. P.R. 2000) (dismissing defendant's claim that § 1385 applies to the Navy: "Defendants
are wrong. Section 1385 prohibits the Army and Air Force from enforcing civilian law, but not
the Navy").
85. 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 371-378, 380-382 (West 2004), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-304, 120
Stat. 1485 (2006).
86. 10 U.S.C.A. § 375 (West 2004).
87. 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 372 -373 (West 2004), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-304, 120 Stat. 1485
(2006).
88. 10 U.S.C.A. § 374 (West 2004), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-304, 120 Stat. 1485 (2006).
In light of the growing threat of terrorism, in 1998 Congress added antiterrorism as a mission area
supported by the DoD. See Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-567 (1998).
89. 10 U.S.C.A. § 374(b)(2) (West 2004), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-304, 120 Stat. 1485
(2006),
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tion of vessels or aircraft outside the United States' land area to issue an
order to stop on behalf of law enforcement officials.90 There is also a
separate statute that allows the DoD to provide assistance to the Depart-
ment of Justice in emergency situations involving chemical or biological
weapons, provided that the assistance does not amount to direct partici-
pation in any arrest, search, seizure, or intelligence gathering. 9'
As a whole, these statutes indicate a congressional willingness to
allow increased military participation in certain law enforcement opera-
tions, but they are explicit in their purpose of prohibiting direct DoD
participation in any law enforcement activities. However, yet another
section of Title 10 states that these grants and restrictions do not curtail
the executive's use of the military to conduct law enforcement opera-
tions beyond any previously existing restraints. 92 Hence, it can be
argued that the Title 10 restrictions do not apply to the Navy because
prior to their passage the existing restrictions were governed primarily
by the PCA, which makes no mention of the Navy. On the other hand,
because DoD regulations barred the Navy's involvement in direct law
enforcement activities prior to the passage of the Title 10 provisions, it
has been reasoned that Congress intended to maintain the status quo and
to uphold the DoD's self-imposed restrictive policy.93 Regardless, it
remains a matter of interpretation as to whether the Navy, absent explicit
statutory authority, is limited only to those law enforcement activities
authorized under chapter 18 of Title 10 and other statutes. The confu-
sion over the PCA and the Title 10 statutory provisions has caused some
scholars to call for revisions and clarification.94
The end result of the PCA and related laws is that the Navy may
conduct some law enforcement activities, but gray areas remain regard-
ing the extent of this authority. Therefore, there is ambiguity as to
90. Id.
91. 10 U.S.C.A. § 382 (West 2004); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332e (West 2004) (authorizing
the Attorney General to request assistance from the DoD in emergency situations involving
WMD). In the case of emergencies involving nuclear weapons, DoD personnel may assist the
Attorney General and make arrests under some circumstances. 18 U.S.C.A. § 831 (West 2004).
92. 10 U.S.C.A. § 378 (West 2004).
93. See United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1986). For a critique of this
view, see Felicetti & Luce, supra note 78, at 157-59.
94. See, e.g., John R. Brinkerhoff, The Posse Comitatus Act and Homeland Security, J.
HOMELAND SEC. (Feb. 2002), http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/brinkerhoffposse
comitatus.htm (stating that the PCA "is inappropriate for modern times and needs to be replaced
by a completely new law," and it "does not provide a basis for defining a useful relationship of
military forces and civil authority in a global war with terrorism"); Felicetti & Luce, supra note
78, at 182 (advocating legislation that would grant DoD personnel law enforcement authority in
certain areas, such as WMD response, and legislation that would permit the Secretary of
Homeland Security to use DoD personnel in any role); but see Kealy, supra note 77, at 430-34
(advocating a more restrictive revision to the PCA and related laws).
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whether the Navy's authority to participate in law enforcement opera-
tions might vary with factors such as the location of the operation, the
substantive law being enforced, the suspects' citizenship, and the degree
of supervision by civilian law enforcement authorities. Because the stat-
utes provide no clear baseline, and the guidelines that are provided are
open to interpretation, there is no definitive, universally accepted rule
concerning the Navy's ability to conduct law enforcement operations.
In light of this legal ambiguity, the DoD has taken a cautious
approach to law enforcement operations. Although the PCA (and the
related laws under chapter 18 of Title 10) apparently do not apply to the
Navy, DoD regulations 95 continue to take a restrained approach and
place restrictions on all branches of the armed forces, except the Coast
Guard. The Navy followed the DoD directive with its own instruction 96
that essentially restates the DoD regulations. Interestingly, the Navy's
instruction acknowledges that the Navy and Marine Corps are not con-
trolled by the PCA but notes that their involvement in direct law
enforcement activities is nevertheless prohibited under DoD policy.9 7
B. The Operational Effect of Restraints on Military Participation in
Law Enforcement
The operational outcome of the statutes and policies is most clearly
visible in counter-narcotics operations. Naval vessels on counter-narcot-
ics patrols are required by law to carry Coast Guard law enforcement
detachments ("LEDETs").98 When the time comes for a Naval vessel to
interdict a suspected drug smuggler, the ship will shift its tactical control
to the Coast Guard, hoist the Coast Guard ensign99 to signify its law
enforcement authority as a temporary Coast Guard unit, and then deploy
its LEDET to carry out the law enforcement boarding. While the
LEDET is responsible for conducting any searches, seizures, or arrests
under its statutory Coast Guard authority, it may utilize Naval personnel
95. DoD Directive 5525.5, supra note 77, enclosure 4 (providing guidelines governing
military participation in civilian law enforcement).
96. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5820.7B (1988).
97. Id. art. 9(a).
98. 10 U.S.C. § 379 (2000).
99. The Coast Guard ensign is the symbol of authority for Coast Guard units carrying out
their law enforcement mission. It was adopted in 1799 at the behest of Treasury Secretary Oliver
Wolcott, who noted that Revenue Cutters required some means of identifying themselves as
having the authority to stop and board vessels to collect tariffs on imports. See GEORGE E.
KRIETEMEYER, THE COAST GUARDSMAN'S MANUAL 84-86 (Naval Institute Press) (8th ed. 1991).
See also infra note 101. The ensign is a flag with sixteen vertical red and white stripes, with the
United States' coat of arms in the upper left hand comer and the Coast Guard emblem centered
over the seventh stripe. 33 C.F.R. § 23.15 (2004).
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
and equipment, but this is carefully done so as to ensure that any law
enforcement activity undertaken by Navy personnel is done under the
supervision of a Coast Guard boarding officer. The Navy can also pro-
vide assistance in compelling a vessel to stop through the use of disa-
bling fire, but the law requires that these actions must occur with a Coast
Guardsman present. '10
It may seem that the elaborate procedure involving the shift of tac-
tical control, hoisting the Coast Guard ensign, and ensuring the LEDET
supervises the actions of Naval personnel is a needless charade.' 1
There is little doubt that the narco-traffickers pay no heed to the argua-
bly artificial distinctions that U.S. law and policy make between the
Navy and Coast Guard's respective authority. However, the procedure
makes sense for several reasons. First, by ensuring that the LEDET is
involved in every step of the operation, it simplifies the identification of
witnesses and makes the subpoena process smoother should the case
proceed to trial. Because Naval personnel are more likely to be unavail-
able to testify at trial due to extended overseas deployments, it makes
sense for Coast Guardsman to supervise their actions and witness all
aspects of the mission. Additionally, the use of LEDET personnel as the
boarding team is mission-effective' 012 because they are specialists in ves-
sel boardings and inspections with extensive training and experience in
the collection and preservation of evidence and in the detection of hid-
den compartments. While Naval personnel have expertise in vessel
boardings, the focus of their training and expertise is generally on mari-
time interception operations. Those operations involve maritime embar-
goes and the interdiction of personnel and weapons to further political or
military objectives, rather than the enforcement of U.S. laws and regula-
tions with the goal of criminal prosecution. Furthermore, Coast Guard
personnel in the field are backed by the dedicated shore-side support of
operators and attorneys who coordinate the case and ensure arrested sus-
100. 14 U.S.C.A. § 637 (West 2004) (authorizing warning shots and disabling fire from naval
vessels or aircraft when a Coast Guardsman is on board).
101. But see United States v. Del Prado-Montero, 740 F.2d 113, 114-16 (1st Cir. 1984)
(recognizing the hoisting of the Coast Guard ensign on board a Navy destroyer as "signifying [the
vessel's] Coast Guard control and mission" and affirming the authority of the Navy to assist the
Coast Guard); United States v. Rasheed, 802 F. Supp. 312, 324-25 (D. Haw. 1992) (in the case of
a joint Coast Guard-Navy boarding of a drug smuggling vessel, viewing the actions of Naval
personnel as legitimate where they avoided direct participation in any searches or arrests and
"provided only logistical support and backup security" to the Coast Guard boarding team).
102. The Navy-LEDET team has been extremely effective and has historically been
responsible for anywhere from approximately one-half to three-quarters of the total amount of
drugs seized on the high seas annually. See Coast Guard Drug Seizure Statistics, http://www.uscg
.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/Drugs/Statswww.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
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pects and evidence pass through the appropriate channels for
prosecution.
Moreover, the Navy ship's tactical shift to Coast Guard control and
its use of the LEDET prevent defense attorneys from obtaining acquit-
tals based on the alleged impropriety of direct Naval involvement in any
search, seizure, and arrest. The Coast Guard's law enforcement author-
ity is well settled in law, 103 and the use of LEDET boarding teams
instead of unsupervised Naval personnel avoids complications at trial.
However, the question remains whether the involvement of Naval per-
sonnel in direct law enforcement activities is actually problematic for
prosecutors. Courts have determined that the PCA itself does not apply
to the Navy,' 0 4 but they have mixed viewpoints concerning the applica-
bility of the provisions of Title 10, chapter 18.101 Despite this, no court
has struck down any maritime drug interdiction on the basis of Naval
involvement. However, some courts have hinted at the creation of an
exclusionary rule should it become necessary to put an end to "wide-
spread and repeated violations" of the Title 10 prohibitions on direct
military participation in civilian law enforcement."0 6 Although courts
have consistently stopped short of applying an exclusionary rule in these
cases, the avoidance of direct law enforcement activities by Naval per-
sonnel in routine circumstances is sound practice simply because it
avoids judicial concerns regarding statutory construction and restric-
tions.' 0 7 Such a policy also reflects the spirit of the PCA and the related
103. United States v. Chaparro-Almeida, 679 F.2d 423, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that the
PCA does not extend to the Coast Guard).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 373-74 (4th Cir. 1974) (explaining that
the PCA does not control the Navy or Marines, although the Navy adopted self-imposed
restrictive regulations); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1093-94 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting
that the PCA "places no restrictions on naval participation in law enforcement operations" and
that inclusion of the Navy in the PCA was considered and rejected by Congress); United States v.
Roberts, 779 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986) (declining to "defy" the PCA's "plain language" by
extending it to the Navy); but see United States v. Chae Wan Chon, 210 F.3d 990, 993-94 (9th
Cir. 2000) (refusing to "construe this omission [of the Navy in the PCA] as congressional
approval for Navy involvement in enforcing civilian laws" including civil enforcement activities
by civilian agents of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service).
105. See, e.g., Roberts, 779 F.2d at 567-68; Rasheed, 802 F. Supp. at 324-25.
106. See Walden, 490 F.2d at 377 (declining to impose an exclusionary rule "at this time" on
the grounds that the court was unaware of any "widespread or repeated violations" of the PCA and
that the military can be expected to abide by its prohibitions); Roberts, 779 F.2d at 568 (citing
United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 85 (5th Cir. 1979)) (adopting Walden and Wolffs' approach
and withholding the application of any exclusionary rule until such time as the military's violation
of the PCA becomes "widespread and repeated," thereby creating a need to deter military
involvement in civilian law enforcement).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1477-78 (1 1th Cir. 1992)
(explaining that "passive participation" of Naval personnel during a Coast Guard operation that
led to the defendants' arrests "did not implicate the Posse Comitatus Act."); United States v.
Kahn, 35 F.3d 426, 432 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that where the Navy provides backup support
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Title 10 laws, even if the letter of the law is somewhat confusing with
respect to the Navy. Until Congress explicitly clarifies the Navy's role
in law enforcement activities, the DoD and Navy will most likely con-
tinue their restrictive policies.
C. An Analysis of the Restrictions on the Navy's Participation in
Law Enforcement
Regardless of the opaque state of the law, the Navy could very
likely take direct law enforcement action - especially in an emer-
gency' - without jeopardizing any subsequent prosecution. In
extraordinary circumstances, such as in the apprehension of dangerous
terrorists, even direct Naval involvement in law enforcement activities is
not likely to trigger the exclusionary rule or otherwise result in an
acquittal under current law.
This probable judicial deference is grounded on several bases.
First, as previously described, 109 courts have been hesitant to invalidate
law enforcement actions by Naval personnel because such involvement
has been infrequent and constrained. Therefore, it is not likely that a
court would invalidate evidence against or the apprehension of sus-
pected terrorists by Naval personnel based on the PCA or any other
related laws. This treatment will likely continue until such apprehen-
sions become "repeated and widespread," which is unlikely given the
sparse record of apprehensions of terrorists at sea. Second, beyond the
debate concerning whether the PCA and related laws apply to the Navy,
there is additional debate as to the applicability of these laws beyond the
United States' territory.1"o This is particularly significant because this is
in a Coast Guard operation and does not participate in the search of the ship or the arrest and
interrogation of the suspects, the military assistance is indirect, not an exercise of military power,
and not pervasive); United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1259 (9th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that the Navy personnel's involvement is not a direct law enforcement activity and
does not violate 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-382); Rasheed, 802 F.Supp at 323-25 (same).
108. DoD policy allows the Navy to take actions that are likely to involve participation in law
enforcement activities upon prior approval by the Secretary of Defense, where the criminal
activity poses a serious threat to the United States' interests and civilian agencies cannot
adequately respond. DoD DIRECTIVE 5525.5, supra note 77, art. E4.3.
109. Supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
110. There are mixed views on the extraterritorial application of the PCA and related laws.
See Kahn, 35 F.3d at 431, where the court concluded that Title 10, Chapter 18's provisions apply
extraterritorially based on its language:
§ 374(b)(2)(F) (mentioning 'law enforcement operation outside of the land area of
the United States'); § 379(a) (mentioning 'naval vessels at sea'); § 379(d)
(mentioning 'area outside the land area of the United States'). Since these sections
impose limits on the use of American armed forces abroad, the appellee is wrong in
suggesting that the restrictions on military involvement in civilian law enforcement
operations do not extend to activities outside the United States.
Kahn, 35 F.3d at 431 n.6. But see United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
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where most potential maritime terrorist apprehensions would be
expected to occur.
Finally, the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine"' bars an acquittal based on the
theory that the method used to bring the defendant before the court was
illegal. The doctrine has been applied in cases where the Coast Guard
was believed to have violated international law in the apprehension of
drug and migrant smugglers. Courts, however, have upheld their con-
victions based on the determination that a defendant could not "assert
the illegality of his obtention to defeat the court's jurisdiction over
him."' 2  Although this principle has generally been applied to cases
involving the extraterritorial apprehension of suspected criminals in vio-
lation of international law, when considered broadly it can also apply to
(stating that "some courts have taken the view that the Posse Comitatus Act imposes no restriction
on use of American armed forces abroad, noting that Congress intended to preclude military
intervention in domestic civil affairs." However, the two cited cases pre-date Title 10, Chapter
18's relevant provisions) (citing Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir. 1948);
D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 351 (9th Cir. 1951)). In 1989, the Department of
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel drafted a memorandum on the PCA's extraterritorial effect. It
concluded that the PCA does not apply extraterritorially and because 10 U.S.C. § 378 (2000)
states that the provisions under Chapter 18 do not reduce the Executive's authority to use the
military for law enforcement purposes, the Chapter 18 laws should not be construed to apply
extraterritorially. Memorandum from the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel to Gen. Brent Scowcroft,
at 20 (Nov. 3, 1989) (on file with author). For a general discussion of the legal and policy
considerations implicated by the extraterritorial application of the PCA and the use of the military
to conduct arrests abroad, see Christopher A. Donesa, Note, Protecting National Interests: The
Legal Status of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement by the Military, 41 DuKE L.J. 867 (1992).
111. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1886) (declining to overturn defendant's
conviction, where defendant was illegally and forcibly abducted in Peru in order to bring
defendant before an Illinois court to stand trial for larceny and embezzlement charges); Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (holding "that the power of a court to try a person for crime is
not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a
'forcible abduction' . . . . There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a
guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his
will").
112. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 873 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine); see also United States v. Best, 304 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine to overturn the trial court's dismissal of migrant smuggling charges against defendant,
where the trial court erroneously held that the defendant's apprehension by the Coast Guard in the
U.S. contiguous zone near St. Croix violated international law and therefore defeated the court's
jurisdiction), rev'g United States v. Best, 172 F. Supp. 2d 656 (D. V.I. 2001). For an alternative
viewpoint and a critique of the Best decision and the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine generally, see Brandy
Sheely, Recent Development, United States v. Best: International Violation Schmiolation - The
Ker-Frisbie Doctrine Trumps All, II TUL. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 429 (2003). Author's note: for
reasons that need not be explored in depth here, I take exception with the court's conclusion that
the Coast Guard's arrest of the migrant smuggler in the U.S. contiguous zone prior to his entry
into U.S. territorial seas violated international law. Per UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 33, a coastal
state may exercise the necessary control within its contiguous zone to prevent infringement of its
immigration laws - this should be construed to include arrest and imprisonment where
circumstances warrant.
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Naval apprehensions in maritime counterterrorism operations." 13
Although courts have invalidated agency law enforcement actions that
exceeded express statutory authority," 4 it is unlikely that the Navy's
mere lack of authority to seize or arrest will prove fatal to any given
apprehension.
In Frisbie,"5 the Court refused to grant habeas corpus relief to a
defendant who had been illegally kidnapped by Michigan state agents in
Illinois and then forcibly returned to Michigan to face murder charges.
The Court reasoned that the defendant's due process rights required only
the hearing on the charges at trial and the manner in which the defendant
was brought before the tribunal was immaterial. Although the Michigan
agents' lack of law enforcement jurisdiction may have made them liable
for civil charges or perhaps criminal charges under a kidnapping stat-
ute, 116 it did not defeat the Michigan court's jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. Even assuming arguendo that a Naval apprehension of a terrorist
on the high seas is not explicitly authorized under U.S. law, it follows
that the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine ensures that this "illegal" apprehension
will generally not result in acquittal.117
113. See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1092-93 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (dismissing the
defendant's invocation of the Toscanino Exception to the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, where defendant
was indicted for violating the Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2000), apprehended by
undercover FBI agents on a yacht in the Mediterranean Sea, and then transported to the United
States by the Navy).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Sarmiento, 750 F.2d 1506, 1506-07 (lth Cir. 1985)
(invalidating the defendant's indictment for marijuana smuggling on the grounds that the Customs
service exceeded its statutory authority by searching and seizing defendant's vessel beyond
"customs waters") In this brief, per curiam opinion, the Sarmiento Court did not consider the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine and invalidated the Customs agents' actions on the ground that their actions
were in direct violation of their statutory authority. Although worthy of a note in itself, it is
debatable whether the outcome would have been different if the court had considered the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine or if the facts involved law enforcement action without statutory authority or vice
law enforcement action in violation of statutory authority.
115. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522-23.
116. Id. at 523.
117. See United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1973) (applying the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine to the Posse Comitatus Act and concluding that the alleged illegal apprehension of the
defendant by military personnel in Vietnam could not constitute a bar to prosecution). There are
two exceptions to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. First, if the defendant's apprehension violated a self-
executing treaty to which the United States was a party (such as an extradition treaty), the court
may not exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. Postal, 589 F.2d at 873-78 (explaining that the
district court lawfully exercised jurisdiction over the defendant despite his allegedly illegal
apprehension by the Coast Guard for drug smuggling in apparent violation of the 1958
Convention on the High Seas, because the treaty was not self-executing); see also United States v.
Alvarez-Machai, 504 U.S. 655, 663-70 (1992) (allowing jurisdiction following the forcible
abduction of a murder suspect from Mexico by Mexicans acting as American agents, despite the
existence of an extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico, on the ground that the
treaty's terms did not bar the defendant's apprehension). The second exception to the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine, known as the Toscanino exception, bars jurisdiction over suspects where the
government's conduct "shocks the conscience" and violates the defendant's due process right.
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Despite the likelihood that occasional direct Naval involvement in
law enforcement would not jeopardize a subsequent prosecution, the
Navy has continued to operate in a manner that avoids such direct partic-
ipation. This is true in counter-narcotics operations, as well as in mari-
time homeland security missions. In these circumstances, the Navy has
operated with the Coast Guard and thereby avoided the question of what
might happen if the Navy conducted law enforcement operations
independently.
Following the September 1 lth terrorist attacks, the Chief of Naval
Operations offered his assistance to the Commandant of the Coast
Guard. As a temporary measure to enhance port security operations, the
Coast Guard assumed tactical control of four Navy patrol crafts and
operated them in the vicinity of the United States' coast to conduct
security boardings." 8 The procedures for this new operation followed
the LEDET model, with Naval personnel providing backup support to
Coast Guard boarding teams. Even if one asserts that these procedures
are unnecessary as a matter of law, they are nevertheless required under
DoD and Naval policy.1"9 This arrangement with the Coast Guard tak-
ing the lead in the law enforcement and the Navy in a supporting role
proved effective for post-9/11 security operations just as it has been for
counter-narcotics operations. 120
For various reasons, the Coast Guard is the appropriate choice for
the maritime homeland security mission. However, as the patrol craft
operations demonstrate, the Navy's cooperation and assistance in home-
land security is often required for mission success. As Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense Paul McHale has described, this "highly effective
partnership between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard"'' is critical
to denying terrorists the ability to strike at the United States' shores.
Thus, the unsettled debate over the PCA and related laws under
Title 10, along with the DoD's arguably over-restrictive, self-imposed
policy concerning the Navy', has little negative operational effect.
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 273-76 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine must yield to the defendant's due process right, which was violated when he was
kidnapped in Uruguay by Brazilians acting as American agents and subsequently tortured for
seventeen days prior to being flown to the United States and arrested).
118. PAl Patrick Mongomery, U.S.C.G., Joining Forces, COAST GUARD, Dec. 2001/Jan. 2002,
available at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/cb/Dec200lJan2002/joiningforces.html. Ultimately,
five of the patrol craft were loaned to the Coast Guard indefinitely in 2004. See Information on
the Cyclone Class PCs and WPCs, http://www.ww2pcsa.org/cyclone-patrol-coastals.htm (last
visited Dec. 24, 2005).
119. It has been suggested that the DoD and Navy should change their regulations to permit
greater involvement in the maritime homeland security mission. See Felicetti & Luce, supra note
77, at 179-82.
120. See supra note 118.
121. Supra text accompanying note 1.
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Rather, the result has been a positive, cooperative approach between the
Coast Guard and Navy in combating maritime drug smuggling and ter-
rorism. In the interest of clarity, it may be prudent for the DoD and
Navy to relax their policies concerning enforcement measures in
counterterrorism or for Congress to revise the statutes to clearly author-
ize direct Naval participation in maritime homeland security operations.
Regardless, however, of any revisions to law and policy, the Navy has a
variety of important roles and missions, and maritime homeland security
can be expected to remain the Coast Guard's responsibility. As such,
the Navy's role as a supporting agency in homeland security is quite
appropriate.
V. THE COAST GUARD, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND
HOMELAND SECURITY
The discussion of the legal elements in the previous section sug-
gests that the Navy could occasionally take direct law enforcement
actions incident to the maritime homeland security mission without any
detriment to prosecutorial efforts. Although it may be prudent for the
DoD and Navy to relax their self-imposed restrictive policies to more
easily allow such actions in exigent circumstances, the Coast Guard
properly retains primary responsibility for maritime homeland secur-
ity."' This makes good sense because maritime homeland security is
principally a domestic law enforcement mission and calls for the Coast
Guard's unique maritime law enforcement expertise. The Navy, whose
missions have traditionally been war-fighting and overseas power pro-
jection, has neither the same degree of law enforcement expertise nor the
clear authority to enforce domestic criminal laws. Thus, regardless of
the applicability of the PCA to the Navy or the question of its extraterri-
torial applicability, the Coast Guard remains the appropriate agency to
assume the lead federal role in regard to maritime law enforcement oper-
ations. However, as experience through real-world operations (such as
the LEDET model) demonstrates, synergy through the cooperation of
the two services enhances operational success.1 23 Even with the Coast
Guard in the lead role for maritime homeland security, the DoD and
122. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 32, at 23.
123. Examples of successful cooperation include "response to the Haiti-Cuba mass migrations
in 1993-94, support of the TWA flight 800 salvage operations, expeditionary force protection in
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on USS Cole, Arabian Gulf UN embargo operations, response
to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, and ongoing peacetime
engagement and counter-narcotics operations." Department of the Navy and United States Coast
Guard, National Fleet: A Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy Statement, Jul. 8, 2002, ai 2 (on file with
author) (describing, generally, the mutual goals of the Navy and Coast Guard to develop defense
plans and procure ships in a manner to avoid duplication of capabilities and to allow each
services' characteristics to compliment one another).
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Navy have essential supporting roles. Such an arrangement is statutorily
supported, as the Coast Guard is authorized to avail itself of the assis-
tance of any federal agency in the performance of its duties. 124
Throughout its history, the Coast Guard has been responsible for
countering criminal threats targeting the United States. Thus, in addition
to its statutory law enforcement authority, the Coast Guard has in place
the cutters, equipment, personnel, training, doctrine, and administrative
support to conduct the maritime homeland security mission and to deny
terrorists access to our shores.
However, Homeland Security is not a new mission for the Coast
Guard. Port and maritime security has been a mission for the Coast
Guard since 1917, with the establishment of the Espionage Act, fol-
lowed by the Magnuson Act. It has received different emphasis over
the years, but security is not a new mission for the Coast Guard....
Maritime Homeland Security has been a responsibility of the Coast
Guard for years, but the threat is different now. We live in a much
different world after 9/11, and we need to train and equip our people
to deal with new and emerging threats. 125
The Coast Guard has enhanced its capability to respond to maritime
terrorism through the establishment of Maritime Safety and Security
Teams ("MSSTs"). MSSTs serve to "safeguard the public and protect
vessels, harbors, ports, facilities, and cargo in waters subject to the juris-
diction of the United States from destruction, loss or injury from crime,
or sabotage due to terrorist activity .... ,"126 In addition to port security
competencies, these teams also have the capability to respond to threats
offshore and board non-compliant vessels suspected of terrorist activi-
ties. Some specialized teams also have the advanced capability to con-
duct opposed boardings. Coast Guard ships and aircraft also have the
capability and unfettered authority to issue disabling or destructive fire
against vessels that fail to comply with orders to stop or otherwise pose
a threat of force.' 27
124. 14 U.S.C. § 14 1(b) (2000). Under this statute, the Coast Guard may "avail itself of such
officers and employees, advice, information, and facilities of any Federal agency . .. as may be
helpful in the performance of its duties." While this statute does not explicitly grant the Coast
Guard power to "deputize" personnel from other agencies (including the Navy) to act under Coast
Guard authority, it may legitimize the use of Naval assets in situations where the Coast Guard may
not be able to respond immediately. See infra text accompanying notes 172-75.
125. Symposium, The Red and Green Lights of Homeland Security, 12 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 89, 91-
92 (2004) (comments by Commander Steve Poulin, U.S.C.G.).
126. 46 U.S.C.A. § 70106 (West 2004), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-241, § 305, 120 Stat. 528
(2006).
127. 14 U.S.C.A. § 637 (West 2004).
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A. The Coast Guard's Broad Jurisdictional Reach
While ships and trained personnel are essential to countering mari-
time terrorist threats, the Coast Guard brings unique characteristics to
the maritime homeland security mission. As the primary governmental
agency for maritime law enforcement, Coast Guard personnel are spe-
cialists in the field with wide jurisdictional reach. Commissioned, war-
rant, and petty officers trained as boarding officers have law
enforcement authority in "waters over which the United States has juris-
diction," '2 8 which creates expansive jurisdictional authority to conduct
law enforcement boardings around the world with flag State consent or
other bases of jurisdiction under international law. Although UNCLOS
vests exclusive flag State jurisdiction in the flag State of vessels sailing
the high seas, 29 this can be waived. 30 The Coast Guard, working with
the State Department, helped negotiate numerous bilateral agreements to
conduct boardings of foreign-flagged vessels suspected of violating U.S.
laws.13' In addition, the Coast Guard has procedures to obtain ad hoc
consent from the flag State to board, search, and arrest vessels not cov-
ered by a ship boarding treaty. Furthermore, the Coast Guard has proce-
dures in place to turn over arrested suspects and evidence to the proper
authorities on land and to provide follow-up support as the case goes to
trial.' 32 Overall, only the Coast Guard possesses the expertise to con-
duct broad-based maritime law enforcement operations on the high seas.
128. 14 U.S.C. § 89 (2000). The phrase "waters over which the United States has jurisdiction"
does not limit Coast Guard authority to those areas over which the United States has exclusive
sovereignty. See, e.g., United States v. Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942, 950 (11th Cir. 1985)
(stating that "merely because a vessel is of foreign registry or outside the territorial waters of the
United States does not mean that it is beyond the jurisdiction of the United States. The United
States has long taken the position that its jurisdiction extends to persons whose extraterritorial acts
are intended to have an effect within the sovereign territory").
129. UNCLOS, supra note 10, arts. 92(1), 94.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1990) (validating the
exercise of United States jurisdiction over a United Kingdom-flagged vessel pursuant to
authorization by the flag State to subject the vessel to American customs laws); United States v.
Rojas, 53 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding the validity of a grant from the
Government of Panama to the United States to board, search, and seize one of its vessels found to
be smuggling cocaine on the high seas).
131. For a discussion of bilateral agreements, see Joseph E. Kramek, Bilateral Maritime
Counter-Drug and Immigrant Interdiction Agreements: Is This the World of the Future?, 31 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 121 (2000). The Coast Guard is also working with various federal
agencies to craft additional shipboarding agreements to further the PSI and SUA convention's
objectives.
132. Procedures for obtaining flag State consent to board a foreign-flagged vessel are outlined
in the MARITIME OPERATIONAL THREAT RESPONSE PILAN, supra note 70.
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B. Interagency Support in Maritime Law Enforcement and Security
Is Critical
In executing its law enforcement mission, the Coast Guard may
require other federal agencies' assistance.133 As described above, the
DoD and particularly the Navy's assistance has proven invaluable in the
war on drugs' 3 4 and in patrolling the American coast following the Sep-
tember llth attacks.' 35 The DoD also has the assets and expertise to
contribute valuable support to secure the homeland from maritime ter-
rorism. From a tactical standpoint, the DoD can provide interdiction
assistance and "specialized support, such as Explosive Ordnance Dispo-
sal (EOD) ' 136 and WMD response.' 37 From a strategic standpoint, the
intelligence, patrol, and surveillance support that the DoD can provide to
detect potential maritime threats is highly valuable.
It is critical that the Coast Guard receives interagency support to
help identify maritime threats. The Coast Guard's concept of maritime
domain awareness, 138 which furthers the goal of total awareness of
potential threats bound for our shores, requires the close cooperation of
all agencies in the intelligence community. As the National Strategy for
Maritime Security states,
the United States will leverage its global maritime intelligence capa-
bility and the diverse expertise of the intelligence and law enforce-
ment communities. The efforts of the existing maritime collection
and analysis means will contribute to an intelligence enterprise
equipped to collect, fuse, integrate, and disseminate timely intelli-
gence information. This intelligence enterprise will support United
States Government agencies and international partners in securing the
maritime domain, as well as their other statutorily assigned missions.
Additionally, the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, and
Justice will oversee the implementation of a shared situational aware-
ness capability that integrates intelligence, surveillance, reconnais-
sance, navigation systems, and other operational information inputs,
combined with access at multiple levels throughout the United States
Government. . . . The establishment of this intelligence enterprise
underscores the need for an integrated and robust maritime command
133. See 14 U.S.C. § 141 (2000) (granting the Coast Guard authority to "avail itself of such
officers and employees, advice, information, and facilities of any Federal agency, State, Territory,
possession, or political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia as may be helpful in the
performance of its duties" when authorized by the head of the respective agency).
134. See supra note 102.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
136. US DEP'T OF DEFENSE, THE DOD ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY: DEFENSE STUDY AND
REPORT TO CONG., at 7 (2003), available at http://www.ndu.edu/uchs/NDAA%20FY02%20
Report%20(DoD%20in%20HS)%20-%20final.pdf.
137. Id. at 7-8. See also supra note 91.
138. See supra note 58.
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and control system to defeat all maritime threats. 13 9
Because of the vastness of the oceans and the United States' shoreline,
maximizing maritime domain awareness is challenging. Recognizing
this, Congress mandated that the Secretary of Homeland Security
"implement a system to collect, integrate, and analyze information con-
cerning vessels operating on or bound for waters subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, including information related to crew,
passengers, cargo, and intermodal shipments." 140 The President also
issued executive orders mandating enhanced information sharing among
government agencies to help protect Americans from terrorist attacks.' 4
The Coast Guard became a member of the United States Intelligence
Community in 2001142 and has already created new assets and proce-
dures to improve its intelligence gathering and analysis capability.' 43
As time goes on, information sharing between the armed forces,
intelligence agencies, and civil enforcement agencies should continue to
improve. Some have even advocated the establishment of a "Maritime
NORAD" under the auspices of NORTHCOM to track all vessels oper-
ating in the oceans near the United States.' 44 While it remains to be
seen whether such a concept will come to fruition, this proposal shows
that it is widely acknowledged that close interagency cooperation in
monitoring the United States' maritime approaches is fundamental to
national defense.
It is in this area that the Coast Guard can best utilize the DoD's
support. For example, in December 2003, the Chief of Naval Operations
139. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 32, at 16.
140. 46 U.S.C.A. § 70113 (West 2004).
141. Exec. Order No. 13,356, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,599 (Sept. 1, 2004); Exec. Order No. 13,311, 68
Fed. Reg. 45, 149 (July 29, 2003).
142. See United States Intelligence Community website, http://www.intelligence.gov/1-
members coastguard.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2005). The Intelligence Community "is a
federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together to
conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of
the national security of the United States." It consists of the following agencies: the Army, Air
Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence
Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Reconnaissance
Office, National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency, and the Departments of Energy, State, Treasury
and Homeland Security.
143. For example, since September 11 th, the Coast Guard has established regional intelligence
collection teams, along with fusion centers on both coasts to analyze intelligence.
144. See Geoff S. Fein, Security Beat: More Attention Urged for Maritime Defense, NAT'L
DEF. MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 2004, at 8, available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/
2004/Jan/Security.Beat.htm; Donna Miles, Planning Group Weighs Value of 'Maritime NORAD,'
ARMED FORCES INFO. SERV., Nov. 3, 2004, http://www.dod.milinews/Nov2004/n 11032004_2004
110304.html; Samantha L. Quigley, Homeland Security Defenses Must Be Active, Layered,
ARMED FORCES PRESS SERV., June 10, 2005, http://www.jtfcs.northcom.mil/pages/news2005O610
.html..
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offered personnel to the Commandant of the Coast Guard to augment the
Coast Guard's Maritime Domain Awareness staff.'45 The memorandum
stated the Navy's full commitment to "supporting the Coast Guard role
as the lead for Maritime Domain Awareness."' 46 In addition, a 2003
agreement between the DoD and DHS authorized the assignment of
sixty-four DoD personnel to the DHS to fill "critical specialties, princi-
pally in the areas of communications and intelligence."' 47 And as previ-
ously discussed, 48 the availability of Naval assets to patrol the
approaches to our coasts has proven an excellent force multiplier. The
DoD's role as a supporting agency in maritime homeland security
enhances the Coast Guard's ability to fulfill its responsibilities in secur-
ing the United States' shores from maritime-based threats. Conse-
quently, the Coast Guard has been working with the DoD and Navy to
create a memorandum of agreement that will provide both the "authority
and procedure for DoD to respond to time-critical situations by rapidly
transferring DoD assets to the Coast Guard to respond to [homeland
security] missions." "'
VI. HOMELAND DEFENSE, HOMELAND SECURITY, AND TERRORISM
Maritime homeland defense is different from maritime homeland
security. As Assistant Secretary of Defense McHale explains it, "[s]ome
have asserted that the distinctions between 'Homeland Defense' and
'Homeland Security' are 'artificial' and 'impractical,' . . . but [they]
rather are complimentary and consistent with the law and operational
requirements."' 50 According to NORTHCOM,
Homeland Security (HLS) is not the same as Homeland Defense
(HLD). Homeland Security is the prevention, preemption, and deter-
rence of, and defense against, aggression targeted at U.S. territory,
sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure as well as the
management of the consequences of such aggression and other
domestic emergencies. Homeland Security is a national team effort
that begins with local, state and federal organizations. DoD and
145. Memorandum from Admiral Vern Clark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations, to Admiral
Thomas Collins, U.S.C.G., Commandant of the Coast Guard (Dec. 29, 2003) (on file with author).
146. Id.
147. McHale, supra note 1, at 13.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
149. RONALD O'ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HOMELAND SECURITY: NAVY OPERATIONS
- BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONG. 3-4 (2005) (CRS Report RS21230) (referring to Draft
memorandum of agreement between the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland
Security for Department of Defense support to the United States Coast Guard for Maritime
Homeland Security (Feb. 2005) (on file with author)), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
homesec/RS21230.pdf.
150. McHale, supra note I, at 4.
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NORTHCOM's HLS roles include homeland defense and civil sup-
port. Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. territory, domestic
population and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanat-
ing from outside the United States. In understanding the difference
between HLS and HLD, it is important to understand that
NORTHCOM is a military organization whose operations within the
United States are governed by law, including the Posse Comitatus
Act that prohibits direct military involvement in law enforcement
activities. Thus, NORTHCOM's missions are limited to military
homeland defense and civil support to lead federal agencies.''
This statement reflects the DoD's restrictive policy on military involve-
ment in law enforcement. Therefore, it clearly limits its authority to
instances of protecting the homeland from military attack and supporting
law enforcement agencies without any direct participation in any search,
seizure, or arrest. Under this approach, any maritime threat targeting
American shores - short of a military attack - will fall under the DHS's
purview and will correspondingly be the Coast Guard's responsibility.
Military threats by foreign governments are the DoD's responsibility.
Accordingly, the Navy and perhaps the Air Force - where a threat
requires rapid, outright destruction by anti-ship missiles or guided
bombs - will likely counter sea-based armed attacks against the
homeland.
A. Maritime Terrorism Does Not Fall Exclusively Under Homeland
Security or Defense
While NORTHCOM's description of its homeland defense roles
seems straightforward, maritime terrorism creates a puzzling question.
Maritime terrorism poses a threat unlike traditional concepts of sea-
based "military" threats against the homeland, such as missile attacks,
submarine warfare, mining of sea lanes and harbors, blockade, and inva-
sion. Because terrorists are non-State actors, they do not fit within the
usual mold of enemy combatants - yet the death and destruction they
seek to inflict is tantamount to that caused by an act of war. Interna-
tional terrorism's dual nature - a crime and/or an act of war - makes it
difficult to draw a clear distinction between homeland security and
homeland defense with respect to the maritime terrorism threats the
United States potentially faces. Prior to September 1 th, terrorism was
generally regarded as a criminal threat, although today it is increasingly
viewed as a military threat:
It is sometimes unclear whether suspected terrorists whose existence
151. U.S. Northern Command - SourceWatch, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=
U.S._NorthernCommand (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
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we happen to discover in the United States, Afghanistan, or else-
where should be targeted for destruction in a military operation or
captured, convicted, and sentenced to a term of years; whether they
should be interrogated for military intelligence, or Mirandized,
advised of their right to remain silent and questioned to obtain evi-
dence that may be admissible in court against them; whether they
should be tried before a military commission or a civilian jury;
whether they are, in the end, prisoners of war (POWs), detainees, or
defendants. There is even some question, from a purely legal stand-
point, whether we should be seeking out all "terrorists of global
reach" or only those who have violated U.S. criminal law by planning
attacks against the United States and its interests overseas.
1 52
These considerations are unresolved when it comes to maritime ter-
rorists, and therefore we face complicated questions regarding the dis-
tinction between homeland security and defense vis-h-vis maritime
terrorism.
However, it is impractical to pigeon-hole maritime counterterrorism
as either a homeland security or a homeland defense mission. It can be
either depending on the circumstances and the desired outcome. Rather
than attend to maritime terrorism with a front-loaded classification as a
law enforcement or-defense mission, planners and operators will likely
have to decide the appropriate response for each threat on an ad hoc
basis and determine whether the outcome should be arrest and prosecu-
tion or destruction and capture. 5 3 This objective-based approach would
increase the likelihood that the right agency with the right tools for the
job is tapped to respond to any given threat. As stated in the National
Strategy for Maritime Security, "the Department of Homeland Security
and the Department of Defense will develop a mutually agreed process
for ensuring rapid, effective support to each other. Terrorist threats will
be addressed as national security incidents employing as appropriate all
152. Sievert, supra note 40, at 308.
153. The dilemma of classifying terrorism as a crime or a military threat poses a statutory as
well as a constitutional law question regarding separation of powers. Because Congress has
spoken on the matter by criminalizing acts of terrorism under U.S. Code Title 18, Chapter 113B,
does this preclude the President from treating acts of terrorism as a military threat? Such an
outcome would seem unconstitutional (if not absurd and potentially dangerous) because the
executive has the constitutional power as commander in chief to take actions in the interest of
national defense. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587, 641-42
(1952). As the potential separation of powers problem is beyond this Note's scope, I will presume
it is within the President's constitutional authority, even absent congressional grant, to take actions
to defeat grave and imminent threats to national security. It follows that the same authority
applies to especially serious terrorist threats. Hence, the President has discretion to respond to a
terrorist threat through law enforcement agencies pursuant to his law execution authority or
through the military in his role as commander in chief for more serious threats (those tantamount
to a military attack).
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instruments of national power to defeat the threat."' 15 4 Under this princi-
ple, the overriding concern in maritime counterterrorism is defeating the
threat and protecting American people and property.
To achieve this end, it is prudent to develop plans that designate
roles for anticipated threats, thereby enabling the Navy and Coast Guard
to develop tactical plans and to train and equip their personnel accord-
ingly. Pursuant to the National Strategy for Maritime Security, 5 the
DoD and DHS have been working towards memoranda of agreement
that lay out the procedures for mutual support between the Navy and the
Coast Guard in maritime homeland security' 56 and homeland defense.157
While such cooperation is essential to the United States' defense and
security, the next section will further explore the objective-based
approach to mission classification and explain why responding to mari-
time terrorism that targets our shores should primarily be a Coast Guard
mission, with the DoD providing support when necessary.
VII. THE COAST GUARD'S ROLE IN HOMELAND DEFENSE
The Coast Guard, as a law enforcement agency 58 and a branch of
the armed forces, 159 is uniquely suited to respond to maritime terrorism
threats. Because the Coast Guard has the authority to execute both mili-
tary and law enforcement missions, it has the greatest flexibility to
respond effectively to maritime terrorism regardless of whether the mis-
sion is considered homeland security or homeland defense. As a result
of its unique dual role, the Coast Guard has developed its own special-
ized equipment, training, and tactics that make it ideally suited to per-
form low to medium intensity combat missions, as well as law
enforcement missions, which characterize most forms of anti- and
counterterrorism operations.
A. The Coast Guard's Traditional Roles in Homeland Defense
It is notable that the Coast Guard has prior experience with home-
land defense missions. As part of its many duties during World Wars I
and II, the Coast Guard lived up to its namesake - by guarding the coast
from enemies through coastal lookouts and pickets to deter attacks by
154. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 32, at 20.
155. Id.
156. See supra note 147.
157. O'ROURKE, supra note 147, at 4-5 (citing the memorandum of agreement between the
Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for the inclusion of the U.S.
Coast Guard in support of Maritime Homeland Defense (on file with author)).
158. 14 U.S.C. §§ 2, 89 (2000).
159. 10 U.S.C. § 101; 14 U.S.C. §§ 1-4, 145 (2000).
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German submarines. 6' In World War II, in addition to its combat oper-
ations overseas, the Coast Guard established "coast watchers" who con-
ducted beach patrols on foot and on horseback. 161 In fact, a German plot
to attack the United States with explosives smuggled into the country by
sea was foiled by one such coast watcher, who discovered saboteurs
shortly after they landed on the south shore of Long Island in 1942.162
In addition, since World War I, the Coast Guard has been responsible for
domestic port security. This entails Coast Guard captains of the port
issuing regulations and conducting patrols to prevent the sabotage of
military equipment during ship load-out and to promote general port
security. 163
With the exception of its continuing and important port security
functions, the Coast Guard's traditional homeland defense missions have
fallen by the wayside. Today, anti-submarine warfare is strictly the
domain of the Navy, and the practice of patrolling the beaches on horse-
back seems quaint from a modem perspective. However, the new mis-
sion of maritime counterterrorism is one that the Coast Guard is poised
to perform well. The DoD, being principally responsible for homeland
defense, should consider the unique characteristics that make the Coast
Guard ideally suited for this mission. Coast Guard and DoD officers
should continue to work closely to ensure that the Coast Guard's special
capabilities are included in homeland defense planning.
B. Defining Homeland Defense and Security and the Objective-
Based Approach
Maritime terrorism should not be considered "homeland defense"
or "homeland security" based solely on the nature of the threat or its ties
to a State sponsor, but rather on the operation's objective. If an identi-
fied threat is bound for the United States' shores and the objective is to
interdict and arrest the suspects, the mission should be considered
"homeland security." Under those circumstances, the Coast Guard,
under the DHS's auspices, should take the lead role in responding to the
threat, which might include DoD assistance. On the other hand, if the
nature of a particular threat is so grave that it requires threat destruction,
the mission should be considered "homeland defense," and the DoD
should take the lead. However, even with the DoD playing the lead role,
in many situations it will remain prudent for the Coast Guard to execute
the interdiction.
160. JOHNSON, supra note 74, at 50, 205-07
161. Id. at 203-05.
162. Id. at 203.
163. Id. at 49-50, 195-96, 281-83.
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C. The Coast Guard is Uniquely Suited to Respond to
Maritime Terrorism
The problem with maritime terrorism is that in many cases an iden-
tified threat may warrant outright destruction as part of a homeland
defense operation, but this may not be evident upon initial detection. As
stated earlier, intelligence is critical to identifying terrorist threats at sea
before they are able to reach the American coast and inflict damage. But
intelligence is not always entirely accurate, nor does it always provide a
complete threat assessment. For this reason, it makes sense for the
Coast Guard to provide the first response to suspected terrorist threats
bound for our shores, particularly in those instances where the nature of
the threat is not fully understood. In its dual role as a law enforcement
agency and an armed force, the Coast Guard has the ability to react to
threats and adapt its operational response accordingly. Thus, the Coast
Guard may approach a potential maritime terrorist threat under its
authority as a law enforcement agency. Then, if circumstances so war-
rant, it can adjust its role to that of an armed force and destroy the target.
Alternatively, if an identified threat is initially thought to be an armed
attack against the United States but is less severe than anticipated, the
Coast Guard's first responder-status permits mission posture flexibility:
the Coast Guard can instantly switch from a homeland defense role to a
law enforcement role. Of course, obvious threats posing an imminent
risk to life and property within the United States must be defeated as
efficiently and decisively as possible. Yet where the threat is not obvi-
ous, it may be prudent for operational decision makers to consider the
flexibility the Coast Guard provides as a first responder.
Under these principles, direct action by DoD forces will only be
required in extraordinary circumstances where a maritime terrorist threat
requires rapid destruction, calling for significant firepower beyond the
Coast Guard's capability, or where adequate Coast Guard assets are not
readily available. Other DoD action, such as explosive ordnance dispo-
sal and WMD response, 64 can be conducted as a complementary civil
support mission under DHS auspices. This approach avoids the quag-
mire created by the PCA and related laws' ambiguity.'65 Although as
described above, 166 the Navy can likely take some direct law enforce-
ment action without disrupting an ensuing prosecution, it should not
have to do so in most situations. Because the Coast Guard has the capa-
bility to assume the role of first responder in both maritime homeland
security and defense, it should do so and allow the DoD to focus on its
164. See supra note 91.
165. See supra Part IV.
166. See supra Part IV.C.
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counterterrorism operations abroad. Preserving maritime counterterror-
ism as primarily a law enforcement mission under the DHS and Coast
Guard's domain precludes an operational clash of cultures - where the
use of DoD personnel, trained and equipped in the "warrior" mindset,
may find themselves in an unfamiliar context where the desired outcome
is not destruction, but arrest. Such a scenario may result in improper
mission execution and degradation in military readiness.
Moving military personnel between these two situations may cause
the soldier to misread or misunderstand a situation and use the wrong
kind of force.... Law enforcement missions emphasize the ability to
loiter, concealment from the adversary, detection of the adversary
through the analysis of indicators and warnings, and, finally, inter-
ception, all under strict constitutional and legal guidelines .... [Mili-
tary units must focus on] warfare, not arrest procedures and rules of
evidence. 167
Furthermore, using the Coast Guard in this role takes advantage of its
extensive shore-side support network to conduct law enforcement opera-
tions and bring maritime criminals to justice. Alternatively, the Coast
Guard's role as an armed force and its close ties to the DoD also allow
captured maritime terrorists to be treated as "enemy combatants," or
prisoners of war. Under appropriate circumstances, in lieu of arrest the
Coast Guard could transfer captured terrorists to the DoD for military
detention. This decision will often not be made until the suspects are in
custody 168 - another reason why the Coast Guard's unique flexibility
suits the counterterrorism mission well.
D. Apportioning Responsibilities Between the Coast Guard
and the Navy
A difficult question arises if, as I posit, the Coast Guard's special
characteristics make it the ideal agency to respond to maritime terrorist
167. Cunningham, supra note 80, at 715-16.
168. The case of Jose Padilla illustrates this point. Padilla, a United States citizen, was
arrested in Chicago in May 2002 on suspicion that he was involved in an al-Qaeda plot to obtain
and detonate a "dirty bomb" in the United States. By the order of the President, he was designated
an "enemy combatant" and transferred to military custody, where he remains today. Although the
legality of Padilla's military detention has been the subject of many law review articles due to his
American citizenship, the merits of his case have yet to be resolved. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks,
War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of
Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 739-40 (2004). If Padilla were not a United States citizen, his
designation as an "enemy combatant" would not likely cause much debate. See Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1, 28-31 (1942) (upholding the military detention of German saboteurs captured in the
United States during World War II). In light of the debate surrounding Padilla's detention, it is
interesting to note that one of the saboteurs, Herbert Haupt, was an American citizen of German-
American ancestry, and the Court flatly determined that his citizenship did not alter his status as
an enemy combatant. Id. at 37-38.
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threats: how far out to sea will these responsibilities reach? Despite its
namesake, the Coast Guard conducts global operations but not nearly to
the same extent as the Navy. Furthermore, the Navy has been working
to enhance its maritime counterterrorism mission and boarding team
capabilities to interdict terrorists and weapons at sea. 169 With the Navy
and the Coast Guard now sharing similar capabilities in maritime inter-
ception operations,170 how should the nation define the boundaries
between the Coast Guard and Navy's maritime counterterrorism
responsibilities?
First, it is too restrictive to rely on some arbitrary dividing line set
some several hundred miles offshore to define the relevant boundary.171
Instead, an objective-based approach should be used. All maritime ter-
rorist threats bound for our shores, or those targeting United States-flag-
ged vessels or citizens, regardless of where they are in the world, should
be the DHS and the Coast Guard's responsibility. This is because it is
more probable that the desired outcome will be prosecution - which is a
law enforcement objective. In executing this global mission, the Coast
Guard may utilize DoD support when necessary. Of course, this
approach remains subject to the overriding rule that in cases requiring
rapid, decisive action, the agency best poised to respond effectively will
be the first responder.
169. See J03 Michael Cokos, U.S.N., Sailors Receive New, More Intense Search and Seizure
Training, NAVY NEWSSTAND, Oct. 20, 2005, available at http://www.news.navy.mil/search/
display.asp?story-id=20669 (describing enhanced, non-compliant boarding training for Navy
visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) teams); Jason Sherman, Doing More: The Navy Is
Developing New Skills and Tactical Units to Provide Commanders with More Capabilities for the
Global War on Terrorism, SEA POWER, Oct. 2005, at 24 (describing the Navy's efforts to improve
"its boarding team capabilities by providing new training and new equipment... [and] acquiring
new capabilities to detect weapons of mass destruction at sea"); see also Lieutenant Colonel Paul
Mullin, U.S.A. & Lieutenant Jon Bartee, U.S.N., Put a Swat Team on Every Ship, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE U.S. NAVAL INST., Dec. 2002, at 30 (advocating the creation of Naval boarding teams on
each ship with advanced tactical boarding training and equipment to more safely and effectively
conduct maritime counterterrorism); Pelkofski, supra note 22, at 24 (noting improvement in
VBSS teams in light of the need for Navy boarding teams to shift their focus from the maritime
sanctions mission to counterterrorism).
170. For a review of maritime interception operations and their justification under international
law, see Lieutenant Commander Richard Zeigler, U.S.N., Ubi Sumus? Quo Vadimus?: Charting
the Course of Maritime Interception Operations, 43 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (1996).
171. In addition to being restrictive, setting fixed boundary lines to delineate areas of mission
responsibility is also difficult from a practical standpoint. As such, defense planners have avoided
bright-line divisions and have instead designated three general areas for homeland security: the
homeland itself, the forward regions (outside the homeland), and the approaches (extending from
the limits of the homeland to the forward region). This framework further states that "all three
regions are not absolute and they may overlap or shift depending on the situation and threat
therefore, all military operations associated with HS will require seamless integration and
synchronization." JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-26, HOMELAND SECURITY, at 1-9
(2005), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new-pubs/jp3-26.pdf.
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Maritime terrorist interdictions and PSI operations abroad should
largely remain the DoD and the Navy's responsibility in cases where
there is no direct link between the threat and our citizens or a potential
target in the United States, thereby rendering the possibility of a prose-
cution in the United States unlikely. 172 In such situations, the objective
of capture for military detention is more likely than arrest for prosecu-
tion because the United States' justice system would not have jurisdic-
tion over the act. Thus, the distinguishing outcome is whether the
targeted suspects are likely to be subjected to the United States' criminal
justice system. Where the United States can lawfully exercise jurisdic-
tion under its domestic and international law, it is proper to consider the
mission as homeland security, and a Coast Guard response is therefore
preferable.
Under this scheme, the Navy retains primary responsibility for the
interdiction of terrorists and WMD where the given threat does not
directly target the United States or its citizens and where there is a low
likelihood of prosecution. It is therefore important that the Navy con-
tinue to develop a non-compliant boarding capability in all its boarding
teams to enable its ships to conduct effective maritime interception oper-
ations overseas and to defeat foreign acts of maritime terrorism and
172. Under various international law theories, the United States can exercise jurisdiction over
maritime acts of terrorism beyond its territorial sea. These theories include: "territoriality,"
"effects," and the "protective principle." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmts. c-d, f (1987). Regardless of the theory used to justify an
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, the law generally allows States to assume jurisdiction over
"conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory"
and "certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the
security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests." Id. § 402(l)(c), (3). The
right to exercise jurisdiction is limited by a standard of reasonableness, which will consider, inter
alia, "the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the
activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in
the territory." Id. § 403(2)(a). These principles have been applied in some maritime counter-
narcotics cases. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 938 (11th Cir. 1985)
(upholding the Coast Guard's boarding of a Honduran vessel on the high seas with flag State
consent and the arrest of its crew for marijuana smuggling and noting "the United States could
prosecute foreign nationals on foreign vessels under the 'protective principle' of international law,
which permits a nation to assert jurisdiction over a person whose conduct outside the nation's
territory threatens the nation's security"). Accordingly, the United States' domestic laws that
criminalize terrorism and associated acts require some link to the United States - e.g. targeting
United States citizens or property, a United States national committing the offense, or committing
an act of violence intended to influence the United States government. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2332-
2332f (West 2004).
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piracy.11 3 This will contribute to the concept of a "layered defense"' 174
to neutralize threats abroad before they can become threats at home.
When circumstances require, the Navy may provide back-up for
homeland security missions where the desired outcome is law enforce-
ment. 175 Because the Navy's occasional involvement in law enforce-
ment activity will not likely invalidate an ensuing prosecution, 176 the
Navy (with the Secretary of Defense's authorization) 177 can provide
interdiction support in emergency law enforcement situations where the
Coast Guard is unable to immediately respond. Although the Coast
Guard remains the "right tool for the job" and should be the lead federal
agency where the desired outcome entails a law enforcement objective
(or where the threat is such that the desired outcome is initially unclear),
Coast Guard assets may not always be immediately available in all
situations.
Geography and asset location are especially significant factors in
this equation. Of course, the Navy has a much greater overseas presence
than the Coast Guard, and a situation might arise where a maritime ter-
rorist threat far from U.S. shores could have a sufficient nexus to be
subject to U.S. domestic antiterrorism laws 178 - thereby rendering the
desired outcome a law enforcement objective. For example, a ship in
the South Pacific Ocean may be carrying arms and terrorists ultimately
bound for the Unites States, or a United States flagged vessel in the
Indian Ocean could be hijacked, but the Coast Guard would not likely be
able to respond immediately and an expedited response by a nearby
Navy boarding team might be preferable. It is these instances where the
Navy's support will prove invaluable in filling gaps in Coast Guard
capability and asset availability - just as the Coast Guard has done for
173. One example of an interdiction operation that the Navy appropriately carried out rather
than the Coast Guard was the interdiction of the Cambodian-flagged, North Korean-owned
freighter So San in December 2002. The Spanish Navy, working with the U.S. Navy, interdicted
the vessel while on the high seas south of Yemen. The boarding revealed a shipment of Scud
missiles bound for Yemen. Ultimately, the shipment was determined to be lawful and legitimate,
and the vessel was allowed to proceed to deliver its cargo. Logan, supra note 45, at 253-54.
Although the intelligence that led to the interdiction suggested conduct that may have adversely
affected United States interests, there was no reason to believe that the conduct was subject to
American domestic criminal law. Such an operation, where the objective does not foresee
bringing detainees before an American criminal court, is appropriately the Navy's responsibility.
174. See Quigley, supra note 144 (citing the DoD's strategy to interdict WMD abroad); see
also supra text accompanying notes 57-61 (the Coast Guard's strategy for maritime homeland
security).
175. 14 U.S.C. § 141 (2000). See supra note 122.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 107-16.
177. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 5525.5, supra note 77, art. E4.5, at 21-23; 10
U.S.C.A. § 374(b)(2) (2004); 14 U.S.C. § 141 (2000).
178. See supra text accompanying note 169.
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the Navy for its coastal warfare missions in both Vietnam 7 9 and Iraq. ' 8 0
Again, a key element is cooperation and support between the two ser-
vices; close coordination in developing response plans, ship boarding
treaties, and disposition options is critical to avoid confusion and
achieve mission success.
If the Coast Guard is to fulfill its appropriate role as first responder
for maritime terrorism targeting our shores, enhanced interagency coop-
eration in the creation of response plans is essential. The DoD, DHS,
NORTHCOM, and Coast Guard must work closely together to develop
such plans and to execute training exercises, thereby ensuring that oper-
ations are conducted smoothly and effectively. In addition, compatible
communications and common doctrine should be adopted wherever pos-
sible.181 Furthermore, adequate and continued funding of the Coast
Guard's expansive recapitalization project, known as Deepwater, 182 is
essential to ensure the Coast Guard has the proper assets to interdict
threats far from our shores in order to secure the homeland from mari-
time terrorism and other criminal threats.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Our nation faces a bloodthirsty and ruthless terrorist enemy. Their
rhetoric speaks for itself. From an al-Qaeda training manual:
The confrontation we are calling for with the apostate regimes does
not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals or Aristotelian diplomacy.
But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination,
bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and
machine-gun. Islamic governments have never and will never be
established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils.
They are established as they always have been, by pen and gun, by
word and bullet, by tongue and teeth .... [We pledge] to make their
women widows and their children orphans . . . to make them desire
death . . . to slaughter them like lambs . . . [and] to be a pick of
destruction for every godless and apostate regime.' 83
It is impossible to negotiate with such an enemy. To terrorists, the only
179. See JOHNSON, supra note 73, at 331-32.
180. See Vice Admiral James Hull, U.S.C.G., et al., What Was the Coast Guard Doing in
Iraq?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE U.S. NAVAL INST., Aug. 2003, at 38, available at http://www.usni
.org/Proceedings/ArticlesO3/PROhullO8.htm.
181. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY, supra note 32, at 22.
182. See Rear Admiral Patrick M. Stillman, U.S.C.G., Deepwater and Homeland Security, SEA
POWER, Apr. 2002, at 65, available at http://www.navyleague.org/sea-power/april 02-10.php
(describing the Deepwater project's importance for modernizing the Coast Guard's fleet to
maximize maritime domain awareness and operational response capabilities).
183. MILITARY STUDIES IN THE JIHAD AGAINST THE TYRANTS 6-8, available at http://www.the
smokinggun.com/archive/jihadmanual.html (attributed to Osama Bin Laden).
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deterrent to their deadly aims is the failure of their mission. It is our
government's foremost priority to secure and defend the homeland from
attack by denying terrorists access to our country.
Because the United States' maritime approaches offer terrorists a
means to access and attack the homeland, they must be secured via a
cooperative effort by numerous government agencies. Maritime domain
awareness is critical to securing our shores. Effective intelligence and
surveillance through layered security measures will expose threats
before they reach our shores and enable their defeat through appropriate
response measures. The appropriate response should reflect the follow-
ing principles:
" Responding agencies must be properly trained and equipped to
handle maritime terrorist incidents. As far as practicable, roles
should be determined in advance to allow agencies to prepare for
their respective roles in combating terrorism.
" The lead federal agency for any maritime terrorist incident should
be the one that has the greatest capability to successfully and
safely execute the mission - for maritime counterterrorism, this
will be either the Navy or Coast Guard.
" Subordinate to the overriding objective of the successful protec-
tion of the homeland from terrorist attack, the lead federal agency
should be determined by an objective-based approach.
" Where a maritime terrorist threat is such that the desired objec-
tive of the response is interdiction and arrest, the mission should
be considered homeland security, and the DHS should take the
lead. Here, the Coast Guard will likely be the lead federal
agency, assisted when necessary by the Navy.
" Where the maritime terrorist threat is such that the threat is con-
sidered a military attack against the United States, and the desired
objective is destroying the threat, the mission should be consid-
ered homeland defense and the DoD will take the lead. Here, the
Navy will likely be the lead federal agency, assisted when neces-
sary by the Coast Guard.
" The Coast Guard's unique status as a law enforcement agency
and an armed force make it ideally suited to respond to most
maritime terrorist incidents, regardless of whether it is initially
considered homeland security or homeland defense. The Coast
Guard has the unique flexibility to perform both missions, and
this flexibility may prove important in such instances where the
exact nature of the threat is unknown and the desired outcome is
unclear. Accordingly, the DoD and Coast Guard should work
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together to ensure that the Coast Guard is included in homeland
defense response plans.
* To separate the areas of responsibility between the Navy and the
Coast Guard in maritime counterterrorism operations, the divi-
sion should not be based principally on geography, but rather on
the operation's desired objective. As a general rule, the interdic-
tion of maritime terrorist threats targeting our shores will be more
likely to result in a prosecution before a United States court, and
therefore the Coast Guard should assume the duties of lead fed-
eral agency. The Navy's role in maritime counterterrorism oper-
ations includes support to the Coast Guard in situations where
Coast Guard assets are unavailable, as well as foreign maritime
interception operations, including WMD interdiction operations
in support of the PSI where there is less likelihood that the
United States will exercise criminal jurisdiction.
There is no room for parochialism in protecting the American peo-
ple from terrorism. Consequently, the shared spirit of the DoD and
DHS, as well as the Navy and Coast Guard, must continue to be colle-
gial and supportive. Yet, there should be some standing delineation
between the Navy and Coast Guard's maritime counterterrorism respon-
sibilities to maximize response coverage and to allow both agencies to
effectively prepare for their missions. This Note has suggested a desig-
nation scheme based on the specific mission's desired objective.
Regardless of what theory is ultimately selected, the Navy and Coast
Guard's continued close cooperation remains essential to avoid overlap
and to allow interoperability in situations where either service acts in
support of the other.
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